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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellee/Respondent Employers' Reinsurance Fund (["ERF") agrees with 
Appellant that this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 63G-4-403 & 78A-4-103 (2010). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTER FOR REVIEW 
1. Issue: Whether the Utah Labor Commission (JLabor Commission") 
properly declined to apply the "odd-lot" doctrine where Appellant/Petitioner George M. 
Olsen ("Olsen") was able to return to work soon after his injury with no medical 
restrictions or modifications, worked successfully thereafter in a supervisory capacity for 
nearly a quarter of a century, moved freely in the labor market, and retired when he was 
eligible to do so for reasons unrelated to his injury. 
Standard of Review and Preservation: ERF agrees that this issue was 
preserved below but disagrees with the "correction of error" standard of review set forth 
by Mr. Olsen. Application of the odd-lot doctrine is a mixe^l question of law and fact. 
See Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2005 UT App 491,1 8, 128 P.3d 31; Smith v. 
Mity-Lite, 939 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Becaus^ the odd-lot doctrine is 
highly fact-dependent, see id. at 687 (noting the "constellation of factors" that must be 
considered and evaluated in terms of the specific individual), the Labor Commission's 
determination is entitled to some deference, see Drake v. Infius. Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 
181-82 (Utah 1997), and will not be disturbed unless it exceeds the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality, Mity-Lite, 939 P.2d at 686. 
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2. Issue: Whether the Labor Commission's findings of fact were adequate 
where the Labor Commission considered the entire record and set forth sufficient bases 
for its conclusions, which were supported by substantial evidence. 
Standard of Review and Preservation: ERF disagrees with Mr. Olsen's 
characterization of this issue but does agree with the standard of review set forth by 
Mr. Olsen. 
3. Issue: Whether the Labor Commission's objectivity was compromised and 
whether the Labor Commission violated Mr. Olsen's due process rights by not promptly 
affirming the denial of benefits by the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). 
Standard of Review and Preservation: Again, ERF disagrees Mr. Olsen's 
characterization of this issue. ERF also disagrees with the standard of review set forth by 
Mr. Olsen. He was not prejudiced by length of time taken by the Labor Commission to 
review the denial of benefits, since benefits were properly denied. Neither was this issue 
properly developed or preserved below. The Utah Administrative Procedures Act allows 
a reviewing agency a reasonable time within which to complete its review of an order, an 
appropriate allowance for an agency with a limited budget. The record reflects one letter 
inquiry to the Labor Commission during the pendency of Mr. Olsen's appeal, but no 
complaint about the amount of time that had passed and Mr. Olsen created no factual 
record about the budget and staff resources available to the Labor Commission against 
which the reasonableness of its conduct could be measured. There was no error by the 
Labor Commission here, and the "correction of error" standard does not apply to this 
issue. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CAS$ 
I. Nature of the Case 
This is a case where Utah's workers compensation program functioned exactly as 
it was intended to do. Mr. Olsen's arm was amputated in 190 following an unfortunate 
industrial accident. He was able to return to work one week|later, his permanent partial 
impairment was rated and paid, and he continued working ft)r the rest of his career with 
no subsequent loss of earnings. At the time of the accident,! Mr. Olsen worked for Utah 
Concrete Pipe as a supervisor. He continued to work in that capacity after his accident 
without medical restrictions or modifications beyond the expected accommodation 
required for his amputation. His skills were in demand - he I was later hired away from 
his Utah employer to accept a similar position in California. While he lived there, he 
piloted a private airplane back and forth between California land Utah for visits. Several 
years later, Mr. Olsen was enticed to return to work for his Utah employer. Mr. Olsen 
retired voluntarily in 1986 at age 62. Even after his retirement, Mr. Olsen provided 
consulting services to his former employer. 
In 2006, forty-three years after the accident and some twenty years after his 
voluntary retirement, Mr. Olsen filed a claim for permanent total disability compensation 
and interest dating back to his 1986 retirement. The claim yas denied - first by and ALJ 
and then by the Labor Commission - because Mr. Olsen failed to establish that he was 
permanently and totally disabled by his industrial accident. Mr. Olsen disagrees with the 
Labor Commission's determination. He argues that the Labor Commission ignored 
evidence and violated his due process rights. It did not. Th^ Labor Commission properly 
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considered the record evidence, including the particular evidence Mr. Olsen says it 
ignored. Neither did the Labor Commission violate Mr. Smith's rights by the way in 
which his appeal was addressed. 
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Mr. Olsen filed an Application for Hearing on or about April 13, 2006. (R. at 1.) 
An evidentiary hearing was held on September 15, 2006, at which Mr. Olsen testified. 
(R. at 50.) At the hearing, Mr. Olsen attempted to support his claim, principally by 
offering two "Summary of Medical Record" forms that purported to describe the reasons 
for Mr. Olsen's retirement in 1986. The forms had been filled out at Mr. Olsen's request 
by two doctors, Dr. Hunter and Dr. Lewis, who had originally treated Mr. Olsen's arm in 
the 1960's. (R. at 150-51, 159.) They apparently returned the forms to Mr. Olsen along 
with accompanying letters. (See R. at 103:406-07 (vol. 3 of Record on Appeal/Medical 
Records Exhibit #1B) & 102:315 (vol. 2 of Record on Appeal/Medical Records Exhibit 
#1 A).)1 ERF objected to the introduction of these documents. They were admitted over 
ERF's objections and then later disregarded when it became apparent that Dr. Hunter had 
not treated Mr. Olsen since 1963 and Dr. Lewis had not treated him since 1972. (R. at 
150-51.) Neither physician had examined Mr. Olsen at the time of his retirement or 
since, and neither physician had reviewed the other medical records describing 
Mr. Olsen's treatment after he left their care. Without this essential foundation, the ALJ 
1
 Mr. Olsen evidences some confusion about these materials and their location in the 
Record. At pages 12-13 of his brief, Mr. Olsen quotes portions of a letter from 
Dr. Lewis, citing to page 406 of the Medical Records Exhibit. The quoted language, 
however, does not appear there. Also, the Summary of Medical Record form prepared by 
Dr. Hunter appears at page 406, rather than page 407, of the Medical Records Exhibit. 
{00186630-1} 4 
excluded the two forms because the doctors' opinions were hot supported and were 
irrelevant to the issues presented in the case. (R. at 52.) 
The ALJ issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on 
September 27, 2006. (R. at 50-58.)2 The ALJ specifically s£t forth and analyzed various 
factors to determine whether Mr. Olsen was permanently totally disabled. (R. at 54-56.) 
In particular, he noted that Mr. Olsen was continuously employed for approximately 
twenty-four years following his injury and continued in the kame important position with 
two different employers. (R. at 56.) He worked without any restrictions imposed by his 
employers or doctors. (R. at 56.) In fact, Mr. Olsen "was able to travel and live for 19 
years without one medical reference to treatment of his [ami] injury." (R. at 56.) 
Mr. Olsen was even called back to work by his employer as a consultant after his 
retirement. (R. at 56.) There was no reduction in Mr. Olseii's earning power and 
Mr. Olsen "was successful for his entire career up to the day he retired." (R. at 56.) 
Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Mr. Olsen had not established that he was 
permanently and totally disabled under the odd-lot doctrine. (R. at 56-57.) Indeed, 
Mr. Olsen did not attempt to demonstrate the first requirement of the odd-lot doctrine -
that he could no longer perform the duties of his occupation!. (R. at 57.) 
On November 16, 2006, Mr. Olsen filed a Motion fof Review with the Labor 
Commission. (R. at 62-74.) On January 28, 2010, the Lab0r Commission issued an 
Mr. Olsen implies that the ALJ's decision was flawed because, he claims, the ALJ was 
released by the Labor Commission "for a series of legal errors, non-judicial demeanor, 
and incompetence generally." (Br. of Appellant at 12.) Tqs unwarranted attack on the 
ALJ is without support in the Record and constitutes irrelevant, immaterial and 
scandalous material. As such, it should be stricken. See Ut^h R. App. P. 24(k). 
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Order Affirming ALJ's Decision. The Labor Commission acknowledged that 
Mr. Olsen's injury understandably caused him difficulty in some aspects of his work and 
in his personal life. (R. at 98.) While Mr. Olsen experienced chronic pain in his arm, he 
was able to treat his pain with Tylenol and "has experienced relatively few medical 
complications from the injury." (R. at 98.) The Labor Commission recognized that 
Mr. Olsen's decision to retire stemmed from several factors, including serious health 
issues unrelated to his injury, frequent travel requirements, and his concern about others 
of his age with similar employment who he believed died due to stress. (R. at 98.) 
The Labor Commission noted that Mr. Olsen was able to continue in his 
employment for Utah Concrete Pipe Company, then went to work for Basalt Rock 
Company in California and was subsequently persuaded to return to work for his 
previous employer in Utah. (R. at 98.) "Mr. Olsen was a competent and sought-after 
management employee throughout the period of his active employment and afterwards 
during his retirement." (R. at 98.) 
The Labor Commission confirmed that it had "reviewed the entire evidentiary 
record in this matter," (R. at 97), and "carefully considered Mr. Olsen's work history, 
both before and after the accident of November 3, 1963," (R. at 99). That work history 
revealed that Mr. Olsen was highly skilled and continued on with a successful career for 
twenty-three years following his injury. (R. at 99.) "It [was] apparent [to the Labor 
Commission] that Mr. Olsen faced a very real challenge when he lost his lower right 
arm." (R. at 99.) However, his injury "did not prevent him from performing 'work of the 
general character he was performing when injured.'" (R. at 99 (quoting United Park City 
{00186630-1} 6 
Mines Co. v. Prescott, 393 P.2d 800 (Utah 1964)).) The Lab^r Commission concluded 
that Mr. Olsen did not fall within the odd-lot doctrine because regular, dependable work 
was available to him. (R. at 99-100.) Mr. Olsen's services were in demand, both in Utah 
and California, after his injury and even after his retirement. (R. at 99-100.) On this 
explicit basis, the Labor Commission affirmed the ALJ's decision. (R. at 100.) 
III. Statement of Facts 
1. Mr. Olsen was injured on November 6, 1963, Vvhile working for Utah 
Concrete Pipe Company when his right arm was caught in a conveyor belt. (R. at 51, 
105.) 
2. As a result of the accident, Mr. Olsen's right afm was amputated just below 
the elbow. (Id.) Mr. Olsen was treated for the injury by Dr. Hunter at McKay Dee 
Hospital. (R. at 105.) 
3. At the time of his injury, Mr. Olsen was a plaint superintendent for Utah 
Pipe Company. (R. at 129.) Mr. Olsen's position was supervisory and he was not 
required to perform any manual labor. (Id.) 
4. Approximately seven days after his accident, fylr. Olsen returned to work 
with Utah Concrete Pipe Company and at the same position. (R. at 51, 108.) 
5. Six months after his accident, Mr. Olsen was hospitalized for a few days 
and again treated by Dr. Hunter. (R. at 51, 150.) Mr. Olsen was not again treated or seen 
by Dr. Hunter after that 1963 hospitalization. (R. at 150-1 ^  1.) 
6. Mr. Olsen's care was then taken up by Dr. Le\yis until approximately 1972 
or 1973, the last time Mr. Olsen saw Dr. Lewis on a professional basis. (Id.) 
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7. Mr. Olsen continued to work for Utah Concrete Pipe Company until the 
latter part of 1969 with no significant job modifications or medical restrictions, though it 
took Mr. Olsen longer to complete his work. (R. at 51, 129.) Mr. Olsen also worked 
longer hours because he supervised two eight-hour shifts and had to be present for both. 
(R. at 146-47.) 
8. Mr. Olsen left his employment with Utah Concrete Pipe Company because 
he accepted employment in California with Basalt Rock Company in a supervisory 
capacity similar to the position he held in Utah. (R. at 5, 51, 130.) 
9. Mr. Olsen worked for Basalt Rock Company for approximately six and 
one-half years. (R. at 5, 51.) 
10. At the time, Mr. Olsen held a pilot's license and his wife owned an 
airplane. (R. at 132, 137.) Mr. Olsen piloted the plane to and from Utah on weekends to 
assist in the care for his ailing parents. (R. at 137.) He stopped piloting, however, after 
being diagnosed with heart arrhythmia. (R. at 133.) 
11. In approximately 1977, Mr. Olsen was enticed to return to Utah and was 
again employed as a plant superintendent by the successor to Utah Concrete Pipe 
Company. (R. at 5, 51, 135.) He continued in his previous management duties but was 
also responsible for training new employees and traveling for his employer to represent it 
at buy-outs. (R. at 120, 123.) His duties included preparing reports industrial injuries for 
the Utah Labor Commission. (R. at 146.) 
12. Mr. Olsen voluntarily retired on December 31, 1986. (R. at 51.) 
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13. At the time of his retirement, and as of the tim0 of the hearing, the overall 
condition of Mr. Olsen's arm was the same as it had been shortly after his injury. (R. at 
51, 135, 141,151-52.) Mr. Olsen had required only occasional treatments for pain and 
infections after his amputation. (R. at 51, 135, 141.) Such treatments were generally 
limited to antibiotics and over-the-counter pain medication. (Id.) 
14. In total, Mr. Olsen was fully employed for twenty-three years after he was 
injured. He was able to perform all of the requirements of hjis job during that time. 
Mr. Olsen did not receive any complaints from his employees regarding his work 
following the accident and received regular raises and bonuses. (R. at 145.) 
15. Mr. Olsen has suffered from numerous additional health problems unrelated 
to his industrial accident including thyroid problems (which required surgery to remove 
the gland), heart arrhythmia (which required insertion of a pacemaker), carpal tunnel 
syndrome, depression, colon cancer and prostate cancer. (RJ. at 51, 132-34.) The bulk of 
Mr. Olsen's non-industrial health issues occurred during thq period near his retirement 
date. (R. at 55.) 
16. Following his retirement Mr. Olsen continued to provide consulting 
services to his employer. (R. at 51, 120.) 
17. Since his retirement, Mr. Olsen has been able to travel extensively, 
including visits to Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Mexico, Germany, Belgium, 
Holland, France and Switzerland. (R. at 139; R. at 103:373J(vol. 3 of Record on 
Appeal/Medical Records Exhibit #1B).) 
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18. In the late 1980's, Mr. Olsen and his wife also served a one-year mission 
for the LDS Church in Ohio. (R. at 148. See also R. at 103:373.) 
19. Mr. Olsen did not consider himself to be legally disabled. On a new patient 
history form he filled out for the Salt Lake Clinic one year following his retirement, 
Mr. Olsen wrote "No" in response to the question "Are you legally disabled?" (R. at 
103:373.) 
20. Mr. Olsen filed an Application for Hearing with the Labor Commission 
seeking permanent total disability compensation on April 17, 2006, some forty-three 
years following his injury and nearly twenty years after his voluntary retirement. (R. at 
1.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Olsen argues that the Labor Commission incorrectly evaluated his case under 
the odd-lot doctrine and ignored evidence of his impairment. Mr. Olsen also claims that 
his due process rights were violated as a result of the time it took the Labor Commission 
to affirm the denial of his claim. However, Mr. Olsen failed to establish that the odd-lot 
doctrine is applicable. For the odd-lot doctrine to apply, as a threshold matter, the injured 
worker must demonstrate he can no longer perform work of the same or similar nature he 
was performing prior to his injury. Mr. Olsen failed to make this showing. In fact, he 
demonstrated just the opposite: he went back to the same job and remained gainfully and 
profitably employed in that capacity for more than two decades. 
The Labor Commission properly considered all the relevant factors and the 
appropriately weighed all relevant evidence. There was no showing that Mr. Olsen could 
{00186630-1} 10 
no longer perform his work. Following his accident, Mr. 01$en was the plant 
superintendant for Utah Concrete Pipe Company. He continued to work in that or similar 
supervisory positions for more than twenty-three years. Mr. Olsen received regular raises 
and bonuses. He was able to move freely in the labor marked accepting employment in 
California for several years, again as a plant superintendant. Mr. Olsen was then enticed 
by his previous employer to return to Utah to work. The injury did not affect Mr. Olsen's 
earning capacity, and Mr. Olsen did not consider himself to be legally disabled. 
Mr. Olsen retired voluntarily in 1986 because he was eligible to do so and because 
of a host of health issues that were not responding to treatment. These issues were 
unrelated to his injured arm. In fact, the record confirms that the condition of 
Mr. Olsen's arm has remained relatively consistent since his accident. There is no 
impairment rating indicating an increase or progression of t\\t permanent partial arm 
impairment for which he was previously compensated. He Has only infrequently required 
over-the-counter pain medication to treat his pain and oral ahtibiotics for occasional 
infections. The Labor Commission did not ignore this evidence. Mr. Olsen simply wants 
this Court to reweigh the facts and make a different determination based on a selective 
reading of the evidence. The evidence as a whole, however, does not support 
Mr. Olsen's claims. The Labor Commission's conclusion that Mr. Olsen had failed to 
meet his burden was a correct one. 
Mr. Olsen's due process challenge is similarly unavailing. Mr. Olsen can show no 
prejudice caused by the amount of time the Labor Commission took to affirm the denial 
of his claim. Apparently because of budgetary and staffing limitations, it required three 
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years to rule on the Motion for Review. That delay was unfortunate but it was not 
prejudicial to Mr. Olsen. Where there are delays in affirming benefit awards, workers are 
paid interest on each foregone benefit payment at the now-aibove-market interest rate of 
8% per annum under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-420(3); where the worker is not entitled to 
benefits there is, of course, no monetary loss. Here, Mr. Olsen's claim was denied 
because he failed to establish that he was permanently and totally disabled. His argument 
that he should be awarded benefits solely because of a delay in the processing of his 
claim and not based on a showing of medical and legal causation of a permanently totally 
disability (Br. of Appellant at 40) must be rejected.3 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ODD-LOT DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE IN THIS CASE 
Mr. Olsen first claims that the Labor Commission erroneously interpreted and 
applied the odd-lot doctrine. (Br. of Appellant at 19.) He argues that the Labor 
Commission failed to consider the facts related to the conditions under which he returned 
to work, his pain, and his retirement. (Br. of Appellant at 23-30.) Mr. Olsen asserts that 
3
 With this argument, Mr. Olsen again departs from the accepted boundaries of advocacy. 
There is no record evidence to support accusations personally impugning the Labor 
Commissioner. Mr. Olsen variously complains that the Labor Commissioner has lost or 
compromised her objectivity, has "compromised her office," that she "has so 
compromised her position that she is in no position to render an unbiased opinion," that 
she "routinely holds appeals" up to five years, and that her disregard for the due process 
rights of injured workers is "blatant." (Br. of Appellant at 3, 7, 18 - 19, 33 - 39.) These 
ad hominem attacks are unwarranted and inappropriate. Delays in adjudications are 
always unfortunate, whether due to workload and budgetary constraints as apparently 
occurred here, or otherwise, but these personal attacks on the Labor Commissioner are 
irrelevant, immaterial and scandalous. They should be stricken. See Utah R. App. 
P. 24(k). 
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had the Labor Commission considered those facts, it would Necessarily have determined 
that he is permanently and totally disabled under the odd-lot doctrine even though he 
continued to work until he retired. (Id.) The Labor Commission, however, properly 
considered the facts of this case. Its Order Affirming ALJ's Decision correctly interprets 
the odd-lot doctrine. 
A. Mr. Olsen had Regular Dependable Employment Available to Him. 
"[A]n employee in the odd-lot category [is] one who s^ so injured that he can 
perform no services other than those which are so limited in quality, dependability, or 
quantity that a reasonably stable market for them does not e^ist." Hardman v. Salt Lake 
City Fleet Mgmt., 725 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1986) (quotation marks omitted). Injured 
employees who fall under the odd-lot doctrine are those wh^ > "are so handicapped that 
they will not be employed regularly in any well-known branch of the labor market." 
Marshall v. Indus. Common, 681 P.2d 208, 212 (Utah 1984) (quotation marks omitted). 
To qualify for disability payments under the odd-lot doctrine, the injured employee must 
establish that he cannot be rehabilitated and can no longer perform the duties required in 
his occupation. Id. That is, the claimant must demonstrate tlhat he is not able to perform 
work of the character he was performing prior to the injury ^nd that "no regular, 
dependable work is available to him." Id.\ Peck v. Eimco Process Equip. Co., 748 P.2d 
572, 574 (Utah 1987). 
Once the employee has presented evidence that he tan no longer perform 
the duties required in his occupation and that he canhot be rehabilitated, the 
burden shifts to the employer to prove the existence 6f regular, steady work 
that the employee can perform, taking into account the employee's 
education, mental capacity and age. 
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Marshall, 681 P.2d at 212. 
The odd-lot doctrine requires an assessment of "a constellation of factors . . . , only 
one of which is the physical impairment." Marshall, 681 P.2d at 211. Other factors 
include the employee's age, sex, education, economic and social environment, and ability 
to gainfully work. Norton v. Indus. Comm'n, 728 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah 1986). 
Mr. Olsen claims that the Labor Commission failed to consider the conditions under 
which he returned to work and instead focused solely on the fact that he returned to work. 
(Br. of Appellant at 23-25.) Mr. Olsen is wrong. The Labor Commission explicitly 
considered the conditions under which Mr. Olsen returned to work. 
The Labor Commission specifically and "carefully considered Mr. Olsen's work 
history," acknowledging that his injury caused Mr. Olsen difficulty in his work, made it 
difficult for him to attend to personal matters, and required additional time to fill out the 
required reports. (R. at 98.) Mr. Olsen worked long hours, in part because he supervised 
two eight hour shifts and he had to be present for both. (R. at 146-47.) Notably, there 
were no medical records evidencing ongoing treatment for, or subsequent aggravation of, 
the industrial injury suffered by Mr. Olsen. (R. at 55.) He worked for a nearly a quarter 
of a century thereafter without medical restrictions or modifications. Mr. Olsen did not 
consider himself to be legally disabled. (R. at 103:373 (vol. 3 of Record on 
appeal/Medical Records Exhibit #1B).) He wrote "No" in response to the question "Are 
you legally disabled?" on a new patient intake form at the Salt Lake Clinic. (Id.) While 
Mr. Olsen's injury certainly caused him permanent impairment and altered his working 
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conditions, the Labor Commission properly considered those points as just two of the 
many factors that must be evaluated in determining whether regular dependable work was 
available to Mr. Olsen. 
Mr. Olsen's argument further ignores the other factors considered by the Labor 
Commission, including the fact that Mr. Olsen demonstrated no loss of earning capacity. 
"[T]he fact that an injured employee returns to work after ai} industrial injury creates a 
rebuttable presumption that the claimant has not sustained permanent and total 
disability." Peck, 748 P.2d at 578. Mr. Olsen failed to rebuj: this presumption. 
Following his injury, Mr. Olsen worked continuously for nearly twenty-four years, 
holding the same or similar positions he held prior to his injjiry. Within one week of his 
industrial accident, Mr. Olsen returned to work for the same employer and at the same 
position he had previously. (R. at 98.) In 1969, Mr. Olsen Vvas induced to accept similar 
gainful employment in California. (Id.) Seven years later, ^lr. Olsen was rehired by his 
previous employer in Utah "[a]t [its] persuasion." (R. at 1 l l ) His skills and abilities 
were in demand. 
Further, Mr. Olsen's job performance was more than satisfactory following his 
injury. His employers obviously appreciated his abilities as he received regular raises 
and bonuses. (R. at 145.) Mr. Olsen possessed expertise in his field and his duties 
included training new employees and traveling frequently o^ i his employer's behalf to 
represent it in buy-outs. (R. at 120, 123.) Other employees were not required to perform 
his job for him. Instead, when Mr. Olsen traveled, his work waited for him to complete 
upon his return. (R. at 123.) See Peck v. Eimco Process Equipment Co., 748 P.2d 572, 
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578 (Utah 1987) (holding that injured employee fell into odd-lot category in part because 
the injured employee could no longer adequately perform his job following and other 
employees had to do much of his work for him). 
Regular, dependable work was available to Mr. Olsen for the remainder of his 
career following his injury. Such work remained available to Mr. Olsen following his 
retirement when he was asked to provide consulting services to his former employer. 
(R. at 51, 100.) "Mr. Olsen was a competent and sought-after management employee 
throughout the period of his active employment and afterwards during his retirement." 
(R. at 98.) An undisputed physical impairment does not necessarily result in a disability, 
nor does it extinguish a claimant's burden of proof. See Marshall, 681 P.2d at 211. An 
injured employee should be not classified as totally disabled under the odd-lot doctrine 
where there is proof of reasonably available employment of the general nature the 
employee was performing previously. See Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Mgmt., 725 
P.2d 1323, 1327 (Utah 1986). Mr. Olsen's skills were not so limited in quality, 
dependability, or quantity that a reasonably stable market for them did not exist. See id. 
at 1326. 
B. The Labor Commission Properly Considered Mr. Olsen's Pain and His 
Reasons for Retiring in Making its Odd-Lot Determination. 
Mr. Olsen also contends that the Labor Commission failed to consider the pain 
resulting from his injury and the reasons he retired. (Br. of Appellant at 25-28.) He 
claims that he suffered from substantial pain as a result of the amputation and that such 
pain alone justifies a finding of permanent total disability. This is incorrect. His 
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condition was undoubtedly painful, but the presence of pain alone does not qualify an 
injured worker for inclusion in the odd-lot doctrine. Mr. Owen's error stems from a 
misreading of Norton. There, the court stated that an employee "who cannot return to 
any gainful employment without suffering substantial pain ik entitled to compensation 
benefits." Norton v. Indus. Comm'n, 728 P.2d 1025, 1028 (tJtah 1986) (quotation marks 
omitted and emphasis added). The court qualified that proposition, however, stating that 
substantial pain may entitle a worker to benefits "[provided that a worker's disability 
was also analyzed within the framework of the odd-lot doctrine." Id. The claimant must 
therefore show that he cannot return to gainful employment without suffering substantial 
pain and that the pain affects his ability to sell his services iiji a competitive labor market. 
See id. at 1028. 
The injured employee in Norton, for example, returned to work for approximately 
six years following his injury, but had to undergo traction and physical therapy. Id. at 
1026. He wore a back brace and took pain medication. Id. Conducting the required odd-
lot analysis, the court determined that a number of factors wjeighed in favor of a finding 
of permanent total disability. The claimant's injury caused fiim numbness and even 
temporary paralysis in his extremities. Id. He had educational limitations, a learning 
disability, and marginal literacy. Id. The worker was apprdximately fifty years old when 
injured and had earned his living "by dint of his brawn, performing arduous physical 
labor." Id. These factors, coupled with the worker's considerable pain, prevented him 
from "be[ing] employed regularly in any well-known branch of the labor market." Id. at 
1027. 
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There was no evidence establishing that Mr. Olsen's pain so handicapped him that 
he could not be employed regularly in any well-known branch of the labor market. The 
Labor Commission found that Mr. Olsen experienced relatively few medical 
complications from his injury. (R. at 98.) The Labor Commission recognized 
Mr. Olsen's claim of pain (i.e., "chronic moderate pain" or, as described by Mr. Olsen, a 
relatively consistent five on a scale of one to ten), but Mr. Olsen was able to manage his 
pain with over-the-counter pain medications. (Id.) There was no medical evidence 
presented of substantial pain and whatever Mr. Olsen's level of pain, it did not interfere 
with his work, require medical restrictions during his work, or affect his lateral 
movement within the market. (R. at 55-56.) It was not increasing and was not 
incapacitating. 
An injured worker's reason for retirement is also one of the many factors to 
consider in making an odd-lot determination. The Court should consider the reasons for 
the employee's retirement and whether the decision was "significantly influenced" by the 
industrial injury. See Peck v. Eimco Process Equip. Co., 748 P.2d 572, 578 (Utah 1987). 
A denial of disability benefits will be upheld on the basis of an employee's voluntary 
retirement "when a finding is made and supported by evidence that the employee's 
retirement is not substantially motivated by his industrial injury, but is due primarily to 
personal or other reasons." Id. 
For example, in Marshall v. Industrial Commission, the injured worker was sixty-
seven years old when he was injured and retired approximately six months after his 
injury. 681 P.2d 208, 210 (Utah 1984). The court held that the Industrial Commission 
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had improperly denied benefits because it relied solely on th^ percentage of the worker's 
impairment and his eligibility for retirement, rather than on his wage-earning capacity. 
Id. at 213. In Peck, the injured worker retired approximately one year after suffering his 
injury. 748 P.2d at 574. The court held that his retirement \yould not result is a denial of 
benefits because there was also substantial evidence that the worker could no longer 
perform his job, that his coworkers did much of his work foi+ him, and that he was not a 
good candidate for rehabilitation. Id. at 574-78. 
Here, the Labor Commission's determination was ba^ed on more than just 
Mr. Olsen's eligibility for retirement. There was ample evidence, as discussed, that 
Mr. Olsen suffered no diminution in earning capacity. The evidence also supports the 
Labor Commission's finding that Mr. Olsen's retirement wa^ motivated by factors other 
than his industrial injury. These factors include a constellation of nonwork-related health 
issues such as thyroid problems (which required surgery to ijemove the gland), heart 
arrhythmia (which required insertion of a pacemaker), carpal tunnel syndrome, 
depression, colon cancer and prostate cancer. (R. at 51, 98, 132-34.) These health issues 
arose prior to his retirement date. (R. at 55.) In a letter to h}s employer, Mr. Olsen 
specified his "health problems" that were not responding to fnedical treatment as 
motivating factors in his decision to retire. (R. at 49.) He did not mention his arm, for 
which he had not sought treatment in years. Other considerations included Mr. Olsen's 
knowledge of others his age he believed had died as a result of stress from similar 
occupations. (R. at 98.) 
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The evidence does not support Mr. Olsen's claim that his decision to retire was 
significantly influenced by his injury that occurred twenty-three years earlier. Nor does 
the evidence support Mr. Olsen's claim that substantial pain rendered him permanently 
and totally disabled. Moreover, these two factors are not dispositive in an odd-lot 
analysis. The ultimate "determination whether to award permanent total disability 
benefits must focus on the decline in the claimant's wage-earning capacity." Id. The 
Labor Commission properly weighed Mr. Olsen's pain and the reasons for his retirement 
in making that determination. Because he failed to demonstrate a decline in his wage-
earning capacity, Mr. Olsen's claim was properly denied. 
C. The Remaining Factors Demonstrate that the Odd-Lot Doctrine is 
Inapplicable. 
Consideration of other factors further confirms that Mr. Olsen is does not fall into 
the odd-lot category. The odd-lot doctrine is generally applied in situations where, in 
addition to the physical impairment suffered by the employee, the employee is of 
advanced age at the time of the injury, lacks formal education, and has limited training 
and skills. See Hardman, 725 P.2d at 1326. Indeed, "[a] considerable number of the 
odd-lot cases involve claimants whose adaptability to the new situation created by their 
physical injury is constricted by lack of mental capacity or education." Marshall, 681 
P.2d at 212 (quotation marks omitted). The Marshall court further emphasized that the 
"majority of the odd-lot cases are concerned with employees whose work required 
physical labor, and many of those employees were 50 years old or older [at the time of 
injury] with moderate or little education." 681 P.2d at 212. Mr. Olsen is well educated, 
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intelligent, and he consistently worked in a supervisory positjion, not as a laborer. (R. at 
98-100.) See Marshall v. Indus. Comm'n, 681 P.2d 208, 211 (Utah 1984) ("Disability is 
evaluated not in the abstract, but in terms of the specific individual who has suffered a 
work-related injury. An injury to a hand would not cause the same degree of disability in 
a teacher, for example, as it would in an electrician."). 
For example, in Marshall, the injured employee had forked as a heavy laborer in 
mines for forty years and had less than a high school education. Id. at 213. He was sixty-
seven years old when injured. Id. at 210. Following his injury he could no longer 
perform the duties required by his job and he could not be rehabilitated. Id. at 213. The 
court determined that the employee was disabled because th^re was no evidence that he 
had any reasonable wage earning capacity following his injury. Id. 
Similarly, the injured employee in Norton v. Industrial Commission was a coal 
miner who began working full-time in the mines at age sixteen and continued for thirty-
nine years. 728 P.2d 1025, 1026 (Utah 1986). "He earned ^ living throughout those 
years by dint of his brawn, performing arduous physical labor that required little, if any, 
skills. Norton's literacy is marginal at best." Id. Following his injury, the employee was 
ineligible for rehabilitation. Id. Based on these facts, the cc^ urt concluded that the 
employee "will not be employed regularly in any well-knoWn branch of the labor market, 
and therefore falls into the so-called 'odd-lot' category." Id. at 1027 (quotation omitted). 
Other cases also demonstrate that injured workers who fall into the odd-lot 
doctrine are laborers, with little education and little hope of Obtaining the same or similar 
employment following an industrial injury. In Peck, the injured employee worked his 
{00186630-1} 2 1 
entire life as a heavy manual laborer and had no education beyond high-school. Peck v. 
Eimco Process Equip. Co., 748 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah 1987). He was sixty-three years old 
at the time of the accident and could not be rehabilitated. Id. Smith v. Mity-Lite involved 
a claimant who "had always worked as a general laborer, working such jobs as 
construction, custodial, and ditch digging. [His] formal education ended after the fifth 
grade, and he lacks the ability to read well." 939 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
The ALJ's and Labor Commission's findings confirm that Mr. Olsen does not fall 
into any of these categories. (R. at 54-56, 97-100.) Mr. Olsen completed three years of 
college. (R. at 54, 97.) He consistently worked in a supervisory position for his 
employers, gaining experience and expertise. (R. at 51, 55, 98.) Opportunities came to 
Mr. Olsen because of that expertise. (R. at 55.) He was able to transfer his skills in the 
national market. 
Similarly, Mr. Olsen attempted no showing that he had educational limitations or 
required re-education or re-training. (R. at 55.) Mr. Olsen instead demonstrated the 
ability to acquire new skills, despite his impairment. Even though he had use of only one 
arm, he acquired a pilot's license and flew regularly as a pilot in command. (R. at 132, 
137.) While Mr. Olsen worked Basalt Rock Company he piloted his airplane between 
California and Utah as often as he could to help care for his ailing parents. {Id.) He 
stopped piloting, however, because of his heart arrhythmia. (R. at 133.) His overall 
health was such that he was able to serve a mission for his church in another state and 
travel to at least 10 foreign countries after he retired. 
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Mr. Olsen failed to demonstrate that he could no longer perform the duties 
required in his occupation or that his accident affected his earning capacity. The ALJ and 
Labor Commission weighed each of the factors identified b^ Mr. Olsen and correctly 
determined that he did not meet his burden. His argument oftly confirms that he 
disagrees with that conclusion, not that the Labor Commission ignored evidence or 
misinterpreted the odd-lot doctrine. 
II. THE LABOR COMMISSION'S DECISION IS SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
Mr. Olsen also claims that the Labor Commission igriored evidence and that its 
factual findings are inadequate as a matter of law. (Br. of Appellants at 31-32.) He 
argues that the Labor Commission failed to consider the conditions under which 
Mr. Olsen returned to work, the impairments in his daily living, that he retired as a result 
of his injury, and ignored statements from his treating physicians. This argument is 
entirely without merit. 
The Labor Commission's findings of fact must be sufficient detailed and include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached. Strate v. Labor Comm'n, 2006 U|T App 179, f 16, 136 P.3d 
1273. In reviewing decisions of the Labor Commission, the Court "will disturb its factual 
findings only if they are 'not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record before the court.'" Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2005 UT App 
491,1 8, 128 P.3d 31. There is no basis for Mr. Olsen's claipi that the Labor 
Commission ignored evidence of the extra time Mr. Olsen required to perform his duties 
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or the difficulties it caused him in his personal life. Here, the Labor Commission 
"reviewed the entire evidentiary record in this matter," (R. at 97), and "carefully 
considered Mr. Olsen's work history," (R. at 99). Indeed, the Labor Commission 
specifically acknowledged that the loss of his arm 
caused Mr. Olsen difficulty in some aspects of his personal and work life. 
It was more difficult for Mr. Olsen to attend to personal matters such as 
dressing, grooming, and the like. At work, it was time consuming for 
Mr. Olsen to fill out required reports with his left hand. 
(R. at 98.) 
Clearly, the Labor Commission did not ignore the evidence cited by Mr. Olsen. 
Its finding that the odd-lot doctrine is inapplicable is logically based on the entire record. 
See Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42, \ 15, 164 P.3d 384 (rejecting 
argument that the Labor Commission's factual findings were inadequate as a matter of 
law). As discussed above, there was substantial evidence that Mr. Olsen's injury did not 
diminish his earning capacity or extinguish the employment market for him. The medical 
records were silent for decades on any treatments for Mr. Olsen's arm injury except for 
occasional reference to over-the-counter pain medications and oral antibiotics. (R. at 51-
53.) Mr. Olsen's pain has not worsened since the time of his injury. (R. at 51.) Neither 
was he ever given an impairment rating indicating that his injury-caused limitations had 
increased above what was originally rated and paid. Mr. Olsen worked successfully for 
more than twenty-three years without medical restrictions or modifications. (R. at 51.) 
The difficulties Mr. Olsen experienced with his arm were not totally disabling and were 
not sufficient to implicate the odd-lot doctrine. 
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Likewise, there was ample evidence to support the L^bor Commission's 
conclusion that Mr. Olsen retired for reasons unrelated to hi$ industrial accident. As 
noted, the Labor Commission found that a number of factor^ contributed to Mr. Olsen's 
decision to retire, including a host of non-occupational problems and health issues. (R. at 
51, 98, 132-34.) Mr. Olsen simply ignores all evidence that supports the ALJ's and 
Labor Commission's determinations in arguing his preferred interpretation.4 
Mr. Olsen also claims that the ALJ, "not understanding the very nature of the 
'odd-lot doctrine,'" improperly cut-off his testimony regarding difficulties he experienced 
in his personal life as a result of the amputation. (Br. of Appellant at 11.) This is 
incorrect. At the hearing, Mr. Olsen began testifying at length about how his injury 
affected his daily activities (activities such as eating, dressing, using the restroom, etc.), 
which it obviously did. Respondents objected to the evidence because it was unnecessary 
to establish Mr. Olsen's industrial claim and was becoming pumulative. The ALJ 
sustained the objection, stating 
4
 While marshaling evidence may not be required when a p^rty challenges the Labor 
Commission's factual findings as a matter of law, Mr. Olsen's selective recitation of the 
facts appears to be an "indirect challenge" to the Labor Conimission's findings and an 
attempt "to reargue the weight of the evidence in favor of [his] position, which is a futile 
tactic on appeal." See Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, ^005 UT App 491, f 27, 128 
P.3d 31. To the extent marshaling is required, Mr. Olsen's ilaim that a selective factual 
summary satisfies the marshaling requirement is incorrect. See Shearer v. Labor 
Comm'n, 2002 UT App 379, No 20010763-CA, 2002 WL 31600809, at *1 (Nov. 15, 
2002) (noting that the challenging party "must present, in comprehensive and fastidious 
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings the [challenging party] resists." (emphasis and alteration in original) (quotation 
marks omitted)). Mr. Olsen simply ignores the evidence th^t supports a denial of 
benefits. 
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it is within common experience of the Court that a person who has suffered 
a traumatic injury . . . will have difficulties . . . . I want to be sensitive to 
hear the things that are important, and everything about this case is 
important to some extent, but I believe it is within common experience of 
the Court to accept that his life has been impacted . . . . But, I do think we 
need to focus more on the elements that are required for the proof, for him 
to establish his claim today, as opposed to taking him through some things 
that may just be uncomfortable to discuss. 
(R. at 118.) The ALJ took proper notice of the difficulty Mr. Olsen has undoubtedly 
experienced in his personal life and then correctly requested that Mr. Olsen provide 
testimony on matters necessary to establish his permanent total disability claim. 
Mr. Olsen also argues that the Labor Commission improperly ignored two 
"Summary of Medical Record" forms provided to him by Dr. Hunter and Dr. Lewis. (Br. 
of Appellant at 11-12, 32.) Mr. Olsen's reliance on these forms, however, is completely 
misplaced. These forms were not relied upon by the ALJ because they lacked foundation 
and were irrelevant to the issues presented. (R. at 52.) Both forms were prepared in 2006 
and purported to explain the reasons for Mr. Olsen's retirement in 1986. ((See R. at 
103:406-07 (vol. 3 of Record on Appeal/Medical Records Exhibit #1B) & 102:315 (vol. 
2 of Record on Appeal/Medical Records Exhibit #1 A).) However, Dr. Hunter had not 
treated or examined Mr. Olsen since 1963, while Dr. Lewis had not seen him 
professionally since approximately 1972. (R. at 52.) Neither had examined Mr. Olsen at, 
near, or since the time of his retirement, and neither had reviewed the medical records. 
These doctors evidenced no basis at all on which to offer opinions relating to Mr. Olsen's 
retirement and the ALJ properly chose not to rely on their reports. 
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In summary, the fact that the Labor Commission concluded that the odd-lot 
doctrine is inapplicable in this case does not demonstrate th t^ the Labor Commission 
ignored evidence. The Labor Commission correctly weighed the evidence, both for and 
against a determination of permanent total disability, and set forth adequate factual 
findings.5 The Labor Commission's findings are sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which it determined Mr. Olsen is not permanently 
and totally disabled. See Strate v. Labor Comm'n, 2006 UT &pp 179, f 21, 136 P.3d 
1273. 
III. THE LABOR COMMISSION DID NOT VIOLATE MR. OLSEN'S DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS 
Mr. Olsen's final argument is that the Labor Commission violated his due process 
rights by rendering a decision on his Motion for Review thr^e years after it was filed. 
(Br. of Appellant at 33-40.) This argument should be rejected because Mr. Olsen can 
show no prejudice as a result of the Labor Commission's delay in reaching a decision. 
As explained, the odd-lot doctrine is not applicable in this c^se and Mr. Olsen was not 
entitled to an award of benefits. Neither is there evidence suggesting that the Labor 
Commission was anything less than objective in evaluating jvir. Olsen's claims. He was 
therefore not prejudiced by any delay on the part of the Labcpr Commission. 
Like other state agencies, the Labor Commission has been limited by ongoing 
budget constraints. Unfortunately, a backlog of cases had accrued by the time Mr. Olsen 
5
 Even if, assuming arguendo, the Labor Commission had failed to directly address some 
of the facts cited by Mr. Olsen, that would not necessarily v a^rrant reversal as a matter of 
law. See Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42,115, 164 P.3d 384. The 
Commission arrived at the correct result in this case based op the records as a whole. 
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filed his Motion for Review. Though not confirmed by this record, the number of cases 
filed with the Labor Commission increased substantially during the ten years prior to 
2008. The legislature addressed the increasing case load by approving an increase in the 
number of administrative law judges at the Labor Commission. Unfortunately, however, 
the Labor Commission staff that handles appeals was not increased commensurately, 
resulting in the backlog that apparently delayed determinations in cases such this. The 
2008 Utah Legislature authorized additional funding for the Labor Commission, allowing 
the Labor Commission to increase its appellate staff. Since that time, the backlog of 
cases on appeal has been dramatically reduced. The delay in resolving this case, 
however, did not deprive Mr. Olsen of due process. 
Mr. Olsen also argues that the Workers Compensation Act should be construed 
liberally and that any doubt or uncertainty in the record must be resolved in favor of the 
worker. ERF does not disagree with the proposition that substantial doubts may be 
resolved in favor of injured workers, but ERF notes that there was no substantial doubt or 
uncertainty in the record before the Labor Commission in this case. Neither is there a 
general presumption of entitlement to workers compensation benefits under Utah law. 
Rather, petitioners have the affirmative burden to demonstrate such entitlement by a 
preponderance of the evidence. E.g., Martinez, 2007 UT 42, ffl 46-54, 164 P.3d 384; 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 (2010). Mr. Olsen failed to meet that burden and his 
"liberal construction" argument is not a substitute for his burden of proof. 
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CONCLUSION 
For each and all of the foregoing reasons, ERF submits that that the decision of the 
Utah Labor Commission denying permanent total disability benefits to Mr. Olsen should 
be affirmed. 
Dated this 27th day of October 2010. 
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS 
EDWIN C. BARNES 
WENDY B. CROWTHEk 
ROBERT D. ANDREASEN 
Attorneys for Respondent ERF 
{00186630-1} 29 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee Employers' Reinsurance Fund to be mailed, via U.S. mail postage prepaid, to 
the following this 27th day of October 2010: 
Aaron J. Prisbey 
1090 East Tabernacle 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Attorney for George M. Olsen 
Thomas C. Sturdy 
BLACKBURN & STOLL 
257 East 200 South, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Utah Concrete Pipe Co. 
Alan L. Hennebold 
LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Utah Labor Commission 
<S^&-
{00186630-1} 30 
